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Introduction and summary
A country’s national saving rate is a crucial determinant 
of its ability to accumulate capital and generate growth; 
hence, it is an important determinant of the country’s 
future prosperity. Another important determinant of a 
country’s prosperity is innovation—the ability to gen-
erate new goods and services and provide existing ones 
in a more efficient manner. Accordingly, it is vital to 
study the households that are savers, as well as the 
managers of the businesses that are innovators. In  
this article, we consider the behavior of a group of in-
dividuals who play both roles in the U.S. economy— 
entrepreneurs. 
First, entrepreneurs accumulate capital. As noted 
by Quadrini (1999, 2000), on average, entrepreneurs 
save a good deal more than other households: Even 
though households headed by entrepreneurs make up 
only 7–8 percent of the population, they own nearly 
one-third of the wealth in the United States. 
Second, entrepreneurial risk-taking is thought to 
be an important way that individuals with skills, ideas, 
and business savvy introduce new products, technolo-
gies, and business strategies into the economy. This is 
the entrepreneur described by economists such as 
Schumpeter (1934) and Knight (1921). Such individ-
uals are willing to put their financial well-being on the 
line in risky business ventures, with the expectation 
of earning large returns and expanding their wealth.
A third important feature of entrepreneurship is 
that the business owner’s personal skills and financial 
resources are much more closely linked to the opera-
tions and performance of the firm than is the case with 
owners of widely held publicly traded corporations. 
Most shareholders of public firms have little say in 
the management of the business; and because their risk 
exposure is limited to the value of their shares, their 
personal portfolios are irrelevant to the assessment of 
the firm’s creditworthiness. In contrast, entrepreneurs’ 
relationships with their businesses are anything but at 
arm’s length. As managers, they make all of the day-
to-day decisions about the firms’ operations. As owners, 
they reap most of the rewards of success, but in many 
cases, their personal assets help finance the business and 
are at risk if the business fails. This means that there 
is a fundamental and bi-directional link between entre-
preneurial households’ portfolios and the performance 
of their businesses.
In this article, we present a number of stylized 
facts that can help us understand the roles that entre-
preneurs play in the U.S. economy. First, we construct 
an empirical counterpart to Schumpeter and Knight’s 
notion of the entrepreneur in the context of the infor-
mation collected by the Federal Reserve Board’s  
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). 
Second, we use the SCF data to document a num-
ber of facts about entrepreneurs and the businesses 
that they run. We show that entrepreneurs, as a group, 
are very rich. They account for about 30 percent of 
the households in the top decile of the wealth distri-
bution in the United States. They also earn more in-
come than others, though the disparity is not as great 
as it is for wealth. They hold about as much total net 
wealth relative to their income as other rich people. 
Entrepreneurs also fall into two demographic catego-
ries that have more wealth than the population as a 
whole; that is, they are more educated and less likely 
to be a minority than the general population. Looking 
at their businesses, we see entrepreneurs operating in 19 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
a wide range of industries. We also find large changes 
in the legal organization of their firms over time, with 
more of them being organized as less risky limited li-
ability entities. 
Third, we shed light on how entrepreneurs’ success 
in business affects their personal wealth. The vast majori-
ty of entrepreneurs start their own businesses as opposed 
to buying or inheriting them—an indication that the 
businesses’ performance reflects the entrepreneurs’ 
personal skills. We also find a great deal of dispersion 
in measures of the businesses’ success, such as firm 
size, income, and rates of return, and we find that rich 
entrepreneurs with large businesses have owned their 
firms for longer than others. In combination, these 
facts indicate that entrepreneurs can face very large 
risks in their business ventures, but successful ones 
can earn huge returns and become very wealthy.
Fourth, we turn the tables and look at the role of 
entrepreneurial wealth in supporting the operations of 
the business. Some households and firms are liquidity-
constrained—that is, they cannot borrow as much as 
they would like to or can only borrow at higher interest 
rates than other market participants. Liquidity constraints 
cause households to save more in order to finance large 
expected expenditures or to have a precautionary buf-
fer to insure against unexpected shocks. We find evi-
dence that entrepreneurs face liquidity constraints: 
Many report having been turned down for credit, and 
many provide personal loans to their businesses or 
pledge personal assets as collateral to secure loans for 
their firms. But we also present some evidence that 
these borrowing constraints may have fallen over time.
Finally, we document that entrepreneurial house-
holds appear to be less risk averse than other compa-
rable households. Despite large variation in the returns 
to their business ventures, relative to other rich house-
holds, they do not have higher net worth (relative to 
income), they tie up a large portion of their wealth in 
their business ventures, and they carry much more 
debt. In addition, entrepreneurs’ responses to attitudi-
nal questions suggest that they are more willing to 
take risks in order to achieve high financial returns.
Who are the entrepreneurs and  
how do we measure them?
It is difficult to define what an entrepreneur is and 
to determine the best empirical counterpart to that defi-
nition (see Gentry and Hubbard, 2004). We think of 
entrepreneurs as people who actively manage their 
own businesses and invest their own wealth in them. 
Our entrepreneurs are not simply managers, because 
managers may not have risked a personal investment 
stake in the firm. Nor are our entrepreneurs simply  
investors, because investors may not have a key active 
role in the decision-making of the firm. Finally, our 
entrepreneurs are not people simply working on their own 
because they can’t find a suitable job at another firm. 
Our unit of observation is the household. We classi-
fy entrepreneurs as those households in which the head 
declares being self-employed as a primary job, own-
ing a business (or a share of one), and having an active 
management role in the firm. We refer to these house-
holds as self-employed business owners, or SEBs.1
By requiring the respondent to be self-employed, 
we exclude people who have a full-time wage-earn-
ing job and are running a business as a hobby. By re-
quiring that the entrepreneur manages the firm, we help 
reduce the reverse causation between business owner-
ship and wealth—that is, we likely eliminate many 
people who simply are rich and acquire a business as 
a passive investment. Finally, by requiring that the 
entrepreneur has an investment stake in the business, 
we also likely exclude those who are self-employed only 
because their outside wage opportunities are very poor. 
We investigate the characteristics of the SEBs 
using six waves of the Survey of Consumer Finances: 
1989, 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001, and 2004.2 The SCF is 
well suited for this exercise. First, one of the primary 
purposes of the SCF is to measure household balance 
sheets: Accordingly, the survey has been designed to 
capture comprehensive information about the value 
of assets and liabilities as accurately as possible. Sec-
ond, since the distribution of wealth is highly skewed 
in the U.S., with a small fraction of the population hold-
ing much of the wealth, the SCF oversamples wealthy 
households in order to better measure economy-wide 
aggregates. Because SEBs are disproportionately wealthy, 
the SCF will sample more SEBs than other surveys 
that sample according to standard demographic prob-
ability weights. Each of the six SCF waves we consid-
er contains between 565 and 930 SEBs; this is a large 
number when compared with other data sets, such as 
the University of Michigan’s Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics, or PSID. (See the appendix for details.)
Third, in addition to wealth, the survey contains 
a wide range of detailed information on income, em-
ployment, borrowing activity, business history, and 
demographic characteristics.3 It also records respon-
dents’ subjective attitudes toward saving and risk.
One drawback of the SCF is that it is a series of 
cross-sectional surveys as opposed to a panel that fol-
lows individual households over time. Accordingly, 
we do not have data on the flow of savings. Instead, 
following standard practice, we study the wealth of 
the household, which is the accumulated flow of its 
past savings (where savings are broadly measured to 20 4Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
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Wealth and income of SEBs and others
	 	 	 	 	
	 1989	 1992	 1995	 1998	 2001	 2004
SEB	percentage	of	total
		Wealth		 33.1	 31.3	 29.2	 30.6	 30.8	 31.9
		Income	 21.3	 17.3	 14.0	 17.9	 17.9	 18.3
	 	 	 	 	 	
Median	wealth	
 (2004 dollars)	 	 	 	 	 	
		SEBs	 388,704	 274,726	 262,421	 384,235	 487,850	 536,000
		Others	 60,139	 56,399	 63,606	 72,318	 79,728	 80,600
	 	 	 	 	 	
Median income 
 (2004 dollars)  	 	 	 	 	
		SEBs	 68,841	 67,475	 52,927	 70,492	 85,403	 79,069
		Others	 36,715	 33,738	 35,285	 37,596	 40,511	 41,075
	 	 	 	 	 	
Median	ratio	of	
	wealth	to	income	 	 	 	 	 	
		SEBs	 5.7	 4.8	 5.1	 4.7	 6.2	 6.5
		Others	 1.5	 1.5	 1.6	 1.8	 1.8	 1.9
	 	 	 	 	 	
Median	ratio	of	wealth	
	(excluding	business	
	net	equity)	to	income	 	 	 	
		SEBs	 2.6	 2.3	 2.7	 2.6	 3.4	 3.5
		Others	 1.5	 1.5	 1.5	 1.7	 1.7	 1.8
Note:	SEB	means	self-employed	business	owner.	
Source:	Authors’	calculations	based	on	data	from	the	Board	of	Governors	of	the	Federal	Reserve	System,	Survey of Consumer Finances.	
include capital gains and losses) plus any inherited 
wealth. The lack of a panel also prevents us from ana-
lyzing linkages between entrepreneurial behavior, 
business failure, and the process of taking successful 
firms public. This means our analysis is susceptible to 
two types of “survivor bias.” The first bias is that our 
sample does not allow us to identify individuals who 
are no longer entrepreneurs because their past busi-
nesses ventures failed. The second bias is that we do 
not capture those entrepreneurs who have successful-
ly taken their businesses public. This first bias would 
leave our SEB sample with households that are more 
successful than the entire population of people who 
have undertaken entrepreneurial activity; the second 
would push us toward underestimating entrepreneurial 
performance. While there is no way to quantify these 
biases with our data, the first is likely more relevant 
for younger and smaller businesses, while the second 
is likely more relevant for older and larger firms. 
Entrepreneurs are rich and what else? 
Table 1 displays data for total household net worth 
and total pretax household income of SEBs and com-
pares them with other households in the U.S. We find 
that SEBs are wealthier than other households.4 They 
own about one-third of the household wealth in the 
U.S., and the median net worth of SEB households 
varies between four times to six and a half times greater 
than the median net worth of non-SEBs. The median 
wealth of SEBs runs between $260,000 and $540,000 
(in 2004 dollars). On average, about 55 percent of 
SEBs fall in the top wealth quintile, and SEBs make 
up about 20 percent of the total number of households 
in the top 20 percent of the wealth distribution in the 
U.S.5 There is no systematic cyclical variation or time 
trend in the allocation of SEBs over the aggregate 
wealth distribution during the 1989–2004 period.
The SEBs also earn more income than other house-
holds, but the difference is not at dramatic as it is for 
wealth. The median income of SEBs is about two times 
greater than the median income of other households, 
and they earn between 15 percent and 20 percent of 
total pretax household income as measured by the SCF. 
As with wealth, there is no clear trend or cyclical pat-
tern to the share of income earned by SEBs. 
As noted by Quadrini (1999, 2000), higher income 
does not account for the higher share of wealth held 
by the SEBs. As seen in the bottom half of table 1, 
the wealth-to-income ratios of SEBs are a good deal 
higher than the ratios for other households. For the 
non-SEB households, the median wealth-to-income 
ratio was about 1.5 in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
and then rose to 1.9 in 2004. For the SEBs, the ratio 
varied between 4.7 and 5.7 over the first four SCF 
waves we consider and then rose to 6.5 in 2004. Clearly,  
because SEBs own businesses, a good deal of the  21 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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Wealth and income for the top decile of the wealth distribution
	 1989	 1992	 1995	 1998	 2001	 2004
	 	 	 	 	 	
Percentage	of	SEBs	
	in	top	decile		 42.8	 37.9	 35.9	 39.2	 37.1	 37.6
Percentage	of	others	
	in	top	decile		 7.2	 7.5	 8.1	 7.7	 7.7	 7.8
	 	 	 	 	 	
Percentage	of	top	
	decile	who	are	SEBs	 32.7	 30.9	 24.0	 29.2	 28.8	 28.1
	 	 	 	 	 	
Median	wealth	
 (2004 dollars)	 	 	 	 	 	
		SEBs	 1,215,984	 1,038,488	 1,100,371	 1,277,309	 1,848,665	 1,956,500
		Others	 923,723	 752,902	 765,240	 980,487	 1,279,169	 1,331,200
	 	 	 	 	 	
Median	income	
 (2004 dollars)	 	 	 	 	 	
		SEBs	 140,742	 125,504	 114,676	 140,984	 206,937	 164,300
		Others	 110,146	 94,465	 97,033	 92,815	 125,914	 133,494
	 	 	 	 	 	
Median	ratio	of	
	wealth	to	income	 	 	 	 	 	
		SEBs	 10.5	 8.8	 10.4	 9.9	 11.8	 13.9
		Others	 9.7	 9.6	 9.0	 11.0	 11.9	 12.3
Note:	SEB	means	self-employed	business	owner.	
Source:	Authors’	calculations	based	on	data	from	the	Board	of	Governors	of	the	Federal	Reserve	System,	Survey of Consumer Finances.
difference between wealth-to-income ratios reflects 
business assets. Overall, the median SEB household 
holds about one-third of its wealth as net equity in its 
business ventures. Non-SEB households hold very little 
business wealth. Even excluding business net equity, 
however, SEB households are wealthier than non-SEB 
households. The last two rows of table 1 show that 
excluding business net equity, SEBs still hold one and 
a half to two times more wealth relative to income 
than other households. 
Are the self-employed business owners different 
from the other rich households? 
Comparing median income, wealth, and wealth-
to-income ratios of all SEBs with all other households 
is of limited value because SEBs fall disproportion-
ately in the upper wealth categories. For a more use-
ful comparison, therefore, table 2 compares the wealth 
and income of SEBs with those of only the households 
in the top decile of the wealth distribution. Thirty-six 
percent to 43 percent of SEBs are in this category 
(row 1), and they account for between one-quarter 
and one-third of the total number of households in 
this portion of the wealth distribution (row 3). Even 
in this narrower category, SEBs are concentrated in 
the upper ends of the wealth and income distributions—
their median wealth is 30–47 percent more than  
the others, and their median income ranges between  
18 percent and 66 percent more. 
Although they are wealthier and earn more income, 
as seen in the bottom two rows of table 2, there is no 
systematic difference between wealthy SEBs and other 
rich households in the ratio of total household wealth 
to income. Note, though, that while the wealth-to- 
income ratio of non-SEBs has shown a fairly steady 
uptrend since 1989, there has been more noticeable varia-
tion in the ratios for SEBs. This reflects volatility in 
the business net equity portions of the SEBs’ portfolios.
Demographics
Table 3 describes the demographic characteristics 
of SEBs. As we noted previously, SEBs account for 
between 7 percent and 8 percent of the households in 
the U.S. There are no trends in the share of SEBs in 
the population over the 1989–2004 period. Some com-
mentators and researchers have postulated that the share 
of self-employed should be countercyclical, as some 
workers who cannot find work for pay when job pros-
pects are poor turn to self-employment. We do not find 
much evidence for such behavior among SEBs.6 
There is no systematic difference in the ages of 
the heads of SEB households and other households  
in the SCF. This means that there are no life-cycle 
reasons for SEBs to have accumulated more wealth 
than other households. However, SEBs do fall dispro-
portionately into two other demographic groups that 
have higher-than-average saving rates. First, SEBs 
are more educated than the rest of the population.  22 4Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
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Demographic characteristics of SEBs and others
  1989  1992  1995  1998  2001  2004
SEB	percentage	
	of	households	 7.6	 8.1	 6.7	 7.4	 7.8	 7.5
	 	 	 	 	 	
Average	age	 	 	 	 	 	
		SEBs	 45.4	 46.9	 47.7	 47.6	 49.7	 50.0
		Others	 48.1	 48.6	 48.5	 48.8	 48.9	 49.5
	 	 	 	 	 	
Average	education	levela	 	 	 	 	 	
		SEBs	 2.8	 3.1	 3.0	 3.1	 3.1	 3.1
		Others	 2.4	 2.6	 2.6	 2.7	 2.7	 2.7
	 	 	 	 	 	
Percentage	of	minorityb	 	 	 	 	 	
		SEBs	 9.5	 13.3	 10.6	 7.7	 8.0	 10.8




Source:	Authors’	calculations	based	on	data	from	the	Board	of	Governors	of	the	Federal	Reserve	System,	Survey of Consumer Finances.	
The SCF records education according to four catego-
ries: no high school degree, high school degree but no 
college, some college, and college degree or more. 
Table 3 shows an index from these responses.7 On aver-
age, SEBs score about 0.4 points higher than non-SEBs. 
The fraction of SEBs with a college degree is 15–20 
percent higher than the fraction for the rest of the popula-
tion. Similar percentages of SEBs and others have some 
college education, and the fraction of SEBs with a high 
school degree or less is 15–20 percent lower than the 
rest of the population. Second, the share of SEBs who 
are minorities is well below the share of non-SEB 
households headed by a minority. As documented by 
Altonji, Doraszelski, and Segal (2000) and Altonji 
and Doraszelski (2005), higher educated households 
have higher-than-average saving rates, while minority 
households tend to save at less-than-average rates. 
What kinds of businesses do self-employed  
business owners run?
Self-employed business owners are found in many 
different industries. The SCF asks detailed questions 
regarding the type of business the SEB manages; since 
1995, however, the public use data sets have aggregated 
the responses into categories that are too broad to dis-
cern much about the industrial composition of the SEBs. 
Still, the detailed data for 1989 and 1992 reveal some 
interesting facts. As seen in table 4, on average in those 
surveys, the largest single category of SEBs was in 
professional practices, such as law, medicine, and ac-
counting; these represented a little over 16 percent of 
the SEB households. The next largest categories were 
contracting and construction, farming and agricultural 
services, and general retail and wholesaling—each with 
between 12 percent and 15 percent. Real estate and 
insurance, manufacturing, business services, and per-
sonal services have shares from 4.5 percent to 7 percent. 
While some of these occupations and industries might 
not be the first that would come to mind when we think 
about entrepreneurship, any of them could include in-
dividuals testing the market with some combination 
of innovative technologies, new products, or novel 
business practices.
Legal structure
The SEBs can choose a variety of legal structures 
for their businesses. The firms can be sole proprietor-
ships or partnerships, in which there is little legal dis-
tinction between personal assets and liabilities and 
those of the business operation. They also can be limited 
liability companies (LLCs), closely held C corporations, 
or S corporations.8 These entities are subject to more 
legal restrictions on governance and management than 
proprietorships and partnerships, but have the advan-
tage of sheltering personal assets from the firm’s 
creditors. They may also provide certain fringe bene-
fits tax free to owners. Furthermore, distributions of 
LLCs and S corporations are treated as personal in-
come and thus avoid double taxation of dividends. 
As seen in table 5, the legal structure of SEBs 
has changed over time. The percentages of respon-
dents whose businesses are sole proprietorships or 
partnerships have trended down, while the percentag-
es of LLCs, C corporations, and S corporations have 
moved up. These trends reflect a variety of factors. 
Limited liability companies were first introduced in 23 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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SEBs, by legal structure of business
	 1989	 1992	 1995	 1998	 2001	 2004
                                      (percent)
	Sole	proprietorship	 54.6	 58.8	 56.5	 53.9	 51.4	 47.3
	Partnership	 22.4	 15.2	 17.7	 14.8	 11.6	 12.1
	LLC,	C	corporation,	or	other	 12.9	 14.7	 11.2	 15.8	 17.4	 22.4
	S	corporation	 10.1	 11.3	 14.6	 15.5	 19.7	 18.2
Notes:	SEB	means	self-employed	business	owner.	LLC	means	limited	liability	company.	Columns	may	not	total	because	of	rounding.		
Source:	Authors’	calculations	based	on	data	from	the	Board	of	Governors	of	the	Federal	Reserve	System,	Survey of Consumer Finances.
the U.S. by Wyoming in 1977, and it took some time 
for other states to offer this option. The favorable tax 
treatment for distributions is relatively new—1986 for 
S corporations and 1988 for LLCs. Furthermore, some 
legal restrictions on ownership and operation have 
changed over time; notably, they were relaxed for  
S corporations in 1997. Finally, there have been several 
changes in the relative tax rates on corporations, indi-
viduals, and self-employment over the 1989–2004 
period. On net, however, the increased attractiveness 
of the limited liability structures appears to have only 
shifted the share of SEBs taking on these legal struc-
tures and not produced an uptrend in the overall share 
of SEBs in the population.
are self-employed business owners wealth 
creators?
Do SEBs create wealth by operating successful 
business ventures? Or are they primarily rich people 
who buy existing successful business operations? In 
order to address this issue, we first look at how the 
SEBs acquired their businesses and how 
long they have owned and managed their 
firms. In order to link the business opera-
tion to the creation of wealth, we then 
consider the relationships between own-
ership tenure, the size of the firm,  
and the income and rates of return that it 
generates. These results will also be use-
ful for our discussion of credit constraints 
and risk aversion later in this article.
Business acquisition and  
ownership tenure
Table 6 presents some more facts 
about SEB businesses. One indication 
that our SEB classification is capturing 
entrepreneurial activity is the fact that be-
tween 65 percent and 79 percent of the 
SEBs started their own business as op-
posed to buying an existing operation, being promot-
ed to ownership/management status, or inheriting the 
firm or receiving it as a gift. Personally starting an 
operation likely takes more initiative and is more 
amenable to the incorporation of new ideas than tak-
ing over an existing operation. Furthermore, the share 
of SEBs starting their own businesses has risen over 
time—a fact that we will return to later when discuss-
ing credit constraints on entrepreneurial borrowing.
The SCF asks SEBs how long they have owned 
and operated their businesses. We will refer to the re-
sponse to this question as ownership tenure. If the SEB 
also started the firm, then ownership tenure would cor-
respond to firm age. If instead the SEB acquired an 
existing firm through purchase, promotion, inheritance, 
or gift, then the tenure would underestimate the firm’s 
age. Of course, since most of the businesses we observe 
were started by the SEB, ownership tenure equals 
firm age for most of our sample.
Between 9 percent and 15 percent of the businesses 
we observe were formed or acquired within the current or 24 4Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
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Characteristics of businesses
  1989  1992  1995  1998  2001  2004
      (percent)
a. all SEBs           
Acquisition	method	 	 	 	 	 	
		Started	 65.3	 72.4	 71.4	 73.9	 78.5	 77.9
		Purchased	 24.7	 23.0	 21.3	 20.4	 17.5	 17.3
		Joined/promoted	 0.7	 0.0	 1.4	 1.9	 1.5	 2.8
		Inherited/gift		 9.4	 4.6	 5.9	 3.8	 2.5	 2.0
	 	 	 	 	 	
Ownership	tenure	 	 	 	 	 	
		0–1	year	 13.2	 15.2	 13.7	 12.6	 9.2	 12.6
		2–5	years	 27.3	 21.0	 24.8	 26.9	 23.4	 25.6
		6	or	more	years	 59.5	 63.8	 61.5	 60.6	 67.4	 61.8
	 	 	 	 	 	
B. Wealthy SEBs           
Acquisition	method	 	 	 	 	 	
		Started	 59.2	 65.1	 63.1	 69.7	 68.8	 67.1
		Purchased	 25.9	 26.5	 26.7	 23.3	 27.4	 25.2
		Joined/promoted	 0.3	 0.0	 1.3	 2.8	 1.0	 3.2
		Inherited/gift		 14.6	 8.4	 9.0	 4.2	 2.9	 4.5
	 	 	 	 	 	
Ownership	tenure	 	 	 	 	 	
		0–1	year	 8.2	 5.5	 5.7	 6.0	 6.2	 6.2
		2–5	years	 19.1	 16.2	 15.2	 14.4	 17.4	 18.0
		6	or	more	years	 72.7	 78.3	 79.1	 79.7	 76.4	 75.8
Notes:	SEB	means	self-employed	business	owner.	Wealthy	SEBs	are	those	in	the	top	decile	of	the	wealth	distribution.	Columns	may	not	total		
because	of	rounding.
Source:	Authors’	calculations	based	on	data	from	the	Board	of	Governors	of	the	Federal	Reserve	System, Survey of Consumer Finances.
previous year of the SCF sampling date, about one-
quarter two years to five years prior to the sampling 
date, and about 60 percent at least six years prior to 
the date. Accordingly, our data set likely contains a 
fairly good mix of start-ups and established firms. There 
is no trend in these tenure shares. However, there is a 
noticeable increase in the share of businesses that were 
started or acquired one year ago or less in 1992 and a 
marked drop in this share in 2001. Both of the 1992 
and 2001 SCF waves are capturing entrepreneurial 
activity during periods of macroeconomic weakness. 
Thus, the data provide conflicting readings on wheth-
er small business formation serves as a substitute for 
work for pay during periods of economic weakness.
A somewhat larger share—between 23 percent and 
27 percent—of wealthy SEBs (those in the top decile 
of the wealth distribution) purchased their businesses 
(panel B of table 6). Still, in every year we consider, 
about two-thirds of the rich SEBs started their busi-
nesses themselves. So it is likely that much of the busi-
ness wealth accumulated by the rich SEBs reflects their 
efforts to start and nurture a successful business plan.
Since rich SEBs hold a good deal more business 
wealth and older firms have more net equity, it is likely 
the case that wealthy SEBs own older operations. This is 
indeed true. Panel B of table 6 presents the tenure of 
the businesses managed by SEBs in the top decile of 
the wealth distribution. Only between 6 percent and  
8 percent of these firms fall in the one year or less cate-
gory—somewhat less than the 9 percent to 15 percent 
for the SEB population as a whole. And between  
73 percent and 80 percent are in the six years or more 
year classification, about 10–20 percentage points 
more than for the overall SEB population.
Business net equity
The SCF calculates business net worth by taking 
the respondent’s assessment of the net value that the 
household would receive if the business were sold  
today plus the net of any lending or collateral provi-
sion from the personal accounts of the household to 
the business ledger. (See the appendix for more de-
tails.9) Figure 1 shows histograms of the net equity  
in the businesses that entrepreneurs actively manage. 
We have combined all six waves of the SCF, recorded 
net equity in 2004 dollars, and combined all businesses 
valued at $1 million or more in the rightmost bar of 
the histograms. For reference, table 7 shows the busi-
nesses’ median net equity by SCF year.
Panel A of figure 1 plots net equity for all firms 
and shows that there is large variation and skewness 
in business net equity. Most firms are small. The left-
most bar of the histogram corresponds with business 
net worth between –$2,200 and $22,000, and indicates 
that 27 percent of firms fall in this category.10 Median 
business net equity is a bit under $100,000. However, 25 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
FIguRE 1
Distribution of business net equity, by ownership tenure
Notes:	SEB	means	self-employed	business	owner.	All	dollar	values	are	in	2004	dollars.	
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many entrepreneurs own firms worth a good deal more; 
about one-third own firms valued at greater than 
$275,000, and 11 percent—the rightmost bar in the his-
togram—own operations valued at $1 million or more.
The net equity in the business varies substantially 
by how long the SEB has owned the business. Panels B, 
C, and D of figure 1 plot net equity histograms by length 
of ownership tenure. As one would expect, young firms 
are disproportionately small: 16 percent of firms with 
tenure of one year or less have zero net equity, and  
39 percent have net equity of less than $22,000 (the 
leftmost hand bar in the histogram). Still, there are a 
few medium-sized young firms, with 10 percent of 
them having net equity above $365,000. Older opera-
tions are much bigger; the median net equity in busi-
nesses with ownership tenure of six years or more is 
about $135,000, and nearly 15 percent have net equi-
ty greater than or equal to $1 million.
Business income
We study two measures of pretax business income. 
(See the appendix for details.) The first reflects profits 
from operations or net equity extracted during a given 
SCF year. We call it “business income cash flow,” or 
BCF, and compute it as wage and salary income and 
other distributions drawn from the business by the  
entrepreneur and his or her spouse. 
The second income measure accounts for unreal-
ized capital gains. The SEB may extract only a frac-
tion of the profits earned by the firm, leaving the rest 
in the business to support and expand its operations. 
In addition, some of the SEB’s efforts may not increase 
current cash flow, but still raise the value of the firm 
by enhancing its ability to generate cash flow in the 
future. Following Moore (2004), we compute our second 
measure of business income by adding an estimate of 
the average annual unrealized capital gains earned by 26 4Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
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Financial returns from the business
	 1989	 1992	 1995	 1998	 2001	 2004
Median	business	wealth	
	net	equity	(2004 dollars)	 95,343	 78,990	 61,514	 92,685	 106,518	 144,000
	 	 	 	 	 	
Median	income	(2004 dollars)	 	 	 	 	 	
		BCFa	 35,000	 42,031	 37,018	 52,999	 55,999	 59,028
		BCF–CGb	 40,500	 49,663	 47,104	 60,200	 70,752	 79,000
	 	 	 	 	 	
Median	rate	of	return (percent) 	 	 	 	 	 	
		RBCFc	 21.1	 28.6	 36.2	 39.0	 33.5	 30.0





Source:	Authors’	calculations	based	on	data	from	the	Board	of	Governors	of	the	Federal	Reserve	System,	Survey of Consumer Finances.
the SEB since acquiring the firm to business income 
cash flow.11 We compute average unrealized capital 
gains for the SEB by taking the difference between 
current firm value and the acquisition costs of the firm 
divided by business tenure. The acquisition cost is the 
tax cost basis the owner would declare if he sold the 
business today. We call this measure BCF–CG for the 
ratio of business income to cash flow including unre-
alized capital gains. The difference between the two 
income measures is hence an estimate of how much 
the SEB has been able to boost the net value of the firm 
through retained earnings, debt reduction, and success-
ful entrepreneurial effort that increases the value of 
the firm. 
Figure 2 plots histograms of BCF that combine 
all six waves of the SCF that we use. The histograms 
combine all firms with earnings greater than or equal 
to $513,000 and those with a loss in excess of $10,000 
in the rightmost and leftmost bars, respectively. Table 7 
presents firms’ median income by SCF year. 
As with net equity, there is a large variation in 
income, and the distribution is skewed: 30 percent of 
the firms make less than $25,000, but 30 percent make 
more than $81,000, and 10 percent more than $200,000. 
While there are some differences in the distribution 
of income by ownership tenure, they are not as great 
as the disparities in net equity. For example, the me-
dian income of firms with ownership tenure of one 
year or less is $36,000, while the median income of 
businesses with tenure of six years or more is $50,000. 
There are some differences in the tails of the distribu-
tions. About 10 percent of the newer firms experience 
losses, while fewer than 5 percent of the longest-held 
ones do; 10 percent of the firms with the shortest tenure 
earn $130,000 or more, while 20 percent of the firms 
with the longest tenure have such income.
Figure 3 and table 7 show BCF–CG. Unrealized 
capital gains significantly boost the business income 
for SEBs. Over all years, the median BCF–CG mea-
sure of income is $56,800, compared with $47,000 
for the median BCF measure. As noted by Moore 
(2004), the increases are sizable across the entire in-
come distribution. Still, the BCF–CG distribution is 
more skewed than the BCF distribution. For example, 
the 30th percentile of the BCF–CG distribution is 
$30,450, compared with $25,000 for that of BCF; the 
70th BCF–CG percentile is $104,900 versus $81,000 
for that of BCF; and the 90th BCF–CG percentile is 
$287,000—almost one and a half times greater than 
that of BCF. The increase in the median income of 
firms with ownership tenure of one year or less is 
large: It rises from $36,000 to $50,000.12 The gains 
(in percentage terms) are smaller for more established 
operations—from $45,000 to $59,400 for firms with 
tenure of two years to five years and from $50,000 to 
$56,700 for firms with tenure of six years or more.
Rates of return
We also compute two measures of the rate of return 
from running one’s business. The first measure, which 
we call RBCF, divides BCF by business net equity. It 
measures the return extracted from the business by the 
entrepreneur in the year covered by the SCF. The sec-
ond measure, which we call RBCF–CG, replaces BCF 
in the numerator with BCF–CG. Thus, it is a more com-
prehensive measure that includes both extracted returns 
and the unrealized increase in value due to retained 
earnings, debt reduction, and entrepreneurial labor.27 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
FIguRE 2
Distribution of business income cash flow (BCF), by ownership tenure
Notes:	SEB	means	self-employed	business	owner.	All	dollar	values	are	in	2004	dollars.	Because	of	the	scaling	used	in	this	figure,		
the	leftmost	bar,	which	represents	businesses	with	a	loss	in	excess	of	$10,000,	is	not	clearly	visible	in	each	panel.	
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Figure 4 reports data on RBCF, while figure 5 
(on p. 30) reports data on RBCF–CG. These figures 
display histograms of the rate of return on the busi-
nesses by ownership tenure for the pooled surveys.  
In both figures, we have combined the rates of return 
of 250 percent or more and all negative rates of return 
in the rightmost and leftmost bars, respectively.13  
Table 7 shows the businesses’ medians of RBCF and 
RBCF–CG for each SCF year. 
With regard to the cash flow measure, the median 
RBCF over all years and SEBs is 33 percent. If this 
were simply a one-year return to capital, then it would 
be a very high rate—after all, this measure excludes 
capital gains, and for comparison, the annual nominal 
rate of return on the Standard & Poor’s 500 stock in-
dex was about 8.5 percent over the 1989–2004 period. 
However, the SEBs’ return includes the return to the 
entrepreneurs’ labor efforts, and so it should exceed 
the return to capital by a good deal. 
The median RBCF masks a wide range of out-
comes. About 5 percent of the SEBs lose money, and 
over one-third of them earn less than a 15 percent re-
turn. But many of them earn very large rates of return— 
30 percent of them earn more than an 80 percent rate 
of return. So clearly there is a good deal of financial 
risk involved with the business ventures of SEBs. 
Much of this risk-taking appears to be undertaken by 
smaller, younger businesses. As seen in figure 4, the 
dispersion of returns for firms with the shortest own-
ership tenure is much greater than that for older firms.14 
Among firms with ownership tenure of one year or less, 
9.4 percent experience losses and another 8.7 percent 28 4Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
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Distribution of business income including unrealized capital gains (BCF–CG), by ownership tenure
Notes:	SEB	means	self-employed	business	owner.	All	dollar	values	are	in	2004	dollars.	Because	of	the	scaling	used	in	this	figure,		
the	leftmost	bar,	which	represents	businesses	with	a	loss	in	excess	of	$10,000,	is	not	clearly	visible	in	panels	C	and	D.	
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have positive returns of less than 5 percent. But the 
median RBCF of the businesses is about 50 percent, 
and about 30 percent of SEBs earn rates of return 
greater than 125 percent. As firms mature, they are 
less likely to suffer very poor annual cash flows, but 
they are also less likely to experience very large returns. 
Only about 4 percent of the businesses with ownership 
tenure of six years or more experience losses. But their 
median RBCF is more than 20 percentage points less 
than the median for the new businesses, and only 20 per-
cent of the mature ventures earn cash flow returns 
greater than 100 percent. 
As seen in figure 5, including an estimate of un-
realized capital gains in the income measure changes 
the rate of return histograms a good deal. But it does 
not change the basic story that entrepreneurs take on 
a great deal of risk and that much of this risk-taking 
in search of large returns appears to be done by 
smaller, younger businesses. 
First, RBCF–CG is substantially larger than RBCF: 
The median return for all SEBs and all years rises from 
33 percent to 43 percent. Second, unrealized capital 
gains boost the returns across all categories of business 
ownership tenure. But the gains are larger for ventures 
with short ownership tenure. For the firms with own-
ership tenure of one year or less, the median for RBCF 
is 49 percent, while the median RBCF–CG is 102 per-
cent. For firms with tenure of two to five years, the me-
dian RBCF and RBCF–CG rates are 40 percent and 58 
percent, respectively, and for businesses with tenure 
of six years or more, the median RBCF and RBCF–
CG rates are 28 percent and 32 percent, respectively. 29 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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Cash flow rate of return (RBCF), by ownership tenure 
Note:	SEB	means	self-employed	business	owner.	
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Third, according to RBCF–CG, few surviving firms 
experience very low returns. For example, even among 
the firms in the shortest ownership tenure category, 
only 7.5 percent experience losses and 90 percent of 
the firms earn returns greater than 16 percent. 
Survivorship and buyout biases
In this section, we discuss some important sources 
of bias in the rate of return calculations. The first is 
an upward survivorship bias. We are only measuring 
the ex post returns of the successful ventures that have 
survived. We do not have any information on how many 
firms lost enough money that they had to cease opera-
tions. Accounting for such losses would lower our 
overall rate of return calculations. 
The second set of biases relates to buyouts  
and divestitures. We do not observe the returns of  
entrepreneurs who have taken their firms public or 
have been bought out by other private firms. This would 
tend to bias down our return measures. However, the 
results of Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) 
suggest that this bias might be small. They compute 
an aggregate, value-weighted return to a portfolio of 
private equity that includes an adjustment for realized 
capital gains in the form of initial public offerings 
and takeovers. They find the adjustment has a small 
effect on the rate of return, on the order of 50 basis 
points. Another potential source of downward bias in 
our rate of return measures is that they do not account 
for income resulting from the divestiture of assets 
that occurs between the time the business was acquired 
and the SCF year (see the appendix). This underesti-
mate may be more important for older firms.30 4Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
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Total rate of return including unrealized capital gains (RBCF–CG), by ownership tenure
Note:	SEB	means	self-employed	business	owner.	
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Evidence of entrepreneurial wealth creation
Because we do not have a panel, we cannot make 
any definitive statements about the process in which 
successful, young firms evolve into rich, old firms. Still, 
the results relating rates of return and net equity to the 
tenure of business ownership provide some insight 
into what that process looks like. 
Many entrepreneurs bring new business ideas to 
the market. Many of these fail. Those that succeed 
have the potential to generate some large cash flow 
returns, even early on in the operating life of the firm. 
A firm with short ownership tenure can also generate 
unrealized capital gains, for example, by paying down 
debt. And such a firm’s survival can also signal an in-
crease in the franchise value of the business. As a suc-
cessful business ages and grows, the rates of return, 
as measured by the cash flowing from the firm to the 
household, fall a good deal. Retained earnings, debt 
reduction, and entrepreneurial effort are still success-
ful in increasing the equity value of the firm. But even 
including unrealized capital gains, the typical returns 
to older firms fall short of those to operations with a 
shorter tenure. This suggests that as the businesses 
age and grow, larger rates of return become less  
common because of diminishing returns to scale and 
because imitators enter the entrepreneur’s niche and 
erode market share. The successful entrepreneurial 
venture ends up with more wealth, a larger business, 
and smaller, but more stable, returns. 
In sum, entrepreneurs face substantial risk–return 
trade-offs. But those who have good ideas, learn, and 
survive can persistently generate substantial returns 
for their businesses. In the end, the successful busi-
nesses make the entrepreneurs wealthy. 31 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Credit constraints, risk preferences, and 
precautionary saving
Ideally, the entrepreneur would be able to borrow 
as needed at a cost that is contingent on the particular 
state of the world that eventually transpires. Such ide-
al conditions do not exist because, in reality, certain 
information is available to the entrepreneur, but not 
the lender; there is limited enforceability of contracts; 
and there is a risk that entrepreneurs might reduce their 
work effort if they do not bear all of the risks and reap 
all of the rewards from their business ventures. These 
features generate less-than-perfect risk sharing be-
tween lenders and entrepreneurs. And in light of the 
large variability in returns, the importance of survivor-
ship, and the relevance of unrealized capital gains for 
entrepreneurs, this lack of risk sharing likely has an 
important influence on the economic environment 
faced by entrepreneurs and their creditors.
One potentially important implication is that entre-
preneurs can face credit constraints. Such constraints 
can take many forms—differences between borrowing 
and lending rates, collateral requirements, or outright 
denial of credit at any price.15 Credit constraints can 
deter entrepreneurs from investing as much as they 
think is necessary to make their businesses profitable 
and can expose them to consumption fluctuations due 
to unforeseen shocks. The more the household is averse 
to risk, the larger the cost of these consumption fluc-
tuations. And so there is an incentive for entrepreneurs 
to self-insure against these costs by building wealth for 
precautionary balances and to finance their business 
operations. However, the degree to which entrepreneurs 
will do so also depends on their attitudes toward risk 
and the severity of the credit constraints they face.
We find qualitative evidence that entrepreneurs 
face credit constraints, though there are indications 
that these have eased over time. We also find evidence 
that SEB households are less risk averse than other 
wealthy households. This discounts the notion that 
the wealth of entrepreneurs disproportionately reflects 
a buildup of precautionary balances. 
Credit constraints
The data seem consistent with the proposition 
that SEBs do face important credit constraints, although 
there is no way to determine how much of SEB wealth 
is associated with such constraints. Furthermore, some of 
our other results suggest that credit constraints have 
moderated over the 1989–2004 period.
The SCF calculates business net worth by taking 
the net value the household would receive if the busi-
ness were sold today plus the net of any lending or 
collateral provision from the personal accounts of the 
household to the business ledger (see the appendix). 
For example, if an SEB puts up a house as collateral 
to secure a line of bank credit to be used by the busi-
ness, this amount is included in the value of business 
net worth. The greater is the degree of credit con-
straints on business lending, the greater the need for 
such lending or collateralization. 
As seen in table 8, a substantial share of SEBs 
make such commitments. In every year we consider, 
more than 15 percent of SEBs have a loan or a guar-
antee or they have pledged collateral to their business. 
Furthermore, the size of these commitments is not triv-
ial. The median value as a share of net equity of the 
firm varies between 12 percent and 25 percent; in 
terms of the household’s net worth, the commitments 
vary between 4 percent and 15 percent. In general, 
there are more cases of lending between households 
and businesses for the limited liability ventures. This 
may simply reflect the fact that for such entities there 
are more legal reasons to distinguish the balance sheet 
of the owner from that of the business. The size of the 
commitment, however, does not vary systematically 
between the various legal forms of business structure.
Further insight into credit constraints can be 
gleaned from a question in the SCF that asks if over 
the past five years the respondent has been turned down 
for credit or not been given as much credit as requested. 
As seen in the bottom portion of table 8, over the first 
four survey years in our sample, SEBs were slightly 
more likely than others in the population to have ex-
perienced such a constraint. However, the relative share 
of SEBs experiencing such limits seems large given 
the disproportionate representation of SEBs in the up-
per ranges of the wealth and income distributions. When 
we consider only those households in the top 10 per-
cent of the wealth distribution, SEBs experienced a 
much higher rate of being turned down for credit than 
other households. As we document, SEBs have much 
higher debt-to-income ratios than other households 
(see table 9). They also may try to borrow more often 
than non-SEB households in order to finance business 
operations. Accordingly, SEBs may experience more  
instances of credit denial by lenders that are concerned 
about their ability to service debt.
Even though SEBs apparently face credit con-
straints, such restrictions appear to have relaxed over 
time. The share of SEBs making loan commitments 
to their businesses declined from nearly 30 percent in 
1989 and 1992 to the 15–20 percent range in the late 
1990s and early 2000s.16 A decline in personal lending 
to the business is evident for all forms of legal structure. 
Furthermore, the percentages of all households in the 
top decile of the wealth distribution that have been 32 4Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
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Credit constraints evidence
	 1989	 1992	 1995	 1998	 2001	 2004
Percentage	of	SEBs	with	a	
	loan,	guarantee,	or	collateral	
	commitment	 	 	 	 	 	
		Sole	proprietorship	 25.2	 23.5	 18.9	 10.1	 11.1	 17.1
		Partnership	 33.3	 27.0	 15.2	 18.3	 20.0	 17.8
		LLC,	C	corporation,	other	 25.8	 39.8	 27.7	 33.8	 22.8	 24.6
		S	corporation	 46.3	 30.3	 36.1	 38.9	 22.7	 26.4
		SEB	total	 29.2	 27.2	 21.8	 19.5	 16.4	 20.6
	 	 	 	 	 	
Value	as	percentage	of	
	business	net	wortha	 12.7	 19.8	 12.2	 22.9	 25.0	 24.7
Value	as	percentage	of	
	household	net	worthb	 4.9	 6.8	 5.7	 8.4	 9.3	 14.5
	 	 	 	 	 	
Percentage	of	households	
	ever	turned	down	for	credit	 	 	 	 	 	
		All	SEBs	 18.2	 21.6	 20.1	 21.1	 15.1	 13.9
		All	others	 17.3	 20.0	 18.4	 19.1	 17.1	 17.8
		SEBs	in	the	top	decile	of	
			wealth	distribution	 16.4	 13.8	 7.4	 12.9	 3.7	 5.2
		Others	in	the	top	decile	of	






Source:	Authors’	calculations	based	on	data	from	the	Board	of	Governors	of	the	Federal	Reserve	System,	Survey of Consumer Finances.
turned down for credit are substantially smaller in the 
2001 and 2004 surveys, and the declines are much larger 
for SEBs than for other wealthy households. Indeed, the 
gap between the two sets of households is quite small 
in the last two surveys. Finally, recall that table 6 (p. 24) 
showed a steady uptrend—from 65 percent in 1989 to 
78 percent in 2004—in the share of SEBs that started 
their own business. The trend could be consistent 
with the view that reductions in liquidity constraints 
make it easier for entrepreneurs to finance new busi-
ness ventures as opposed to purchasing established 
operations that might be more easily collateralized 
than a new operation.
Risk aversion and precautionary saving
All else being equal, one might expect SEBs to 
engage in more precautionary saving to compensate 
for the extra risk associated with the large variation in 
returns to their businesses. However, entrepreneurs ap-
pear to be less risk averse than other wealthy house-
holds, which mitigates the degree of precautionary 
saving we would expect to observe.
The SCF asks respondents about the amount of 
financial risk they are willing to take in order to receive 
financial returns when they save or make investments. 
The survey asks respondents if they are willing to:  
1) Take substantial financial risks expecting to earn 
substantial returns, 2) Take above average financial 
risks expecting to earn above average returns, or 3) Take 
average financial risks expecting to earn average returns, 
or if they are 4) Not willing to take any financial risks. 
As seen in table 9, on balance, SEBs respond that their 
willingness to take risks for high returns is somewhat 
more than average, while non-SEBs respond that 
their tolerance for risk is somewhat less than average 
(also see Moore, 2004, and Herranz, Krasa, and  
Villamil, 2007).
In addition, entrepreneurs do not seem to diversify 
very much away from their businesses. The median 
share of household income SEBs earn from their busi-
nesses is well over one-half (see table 9). Furthermore, 
this share increased steadily over the sample period; 
from just under 60 percent in 1989 to nearly 85 per-
cent in 2004.17 By comparison, the median non-SEB 
household (not shown in table 9) earns no business 
income, and the average share of business income in 
total income for such households varies between just 
2.5 percent and 6.25 percent. Also, SEBs leave a large 
portion—about one-third—of their wealth in their 
businesses, meaning that a substantial portion of their 
ability to consume is unhedged against bad business 
outcomes. This lack of diversification stands out 33 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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Risk tolerance of SEBs and others
	 1989	 1992	 1995	 1998	 2001	 2004
Subjective	risk	intolerancea	 	 	 	 	 	
		SEBs	 3.0	 2.9	 2.9	 2.8	 2.9	 2.8
		Others		 3.3	 3.4	 3.3	 3.1	 3.1	 3.2
	 	 	 	 	 	
Percentage	of	SEB	wealth	
	invested	in	the	business	 34.4	 33.3	 30.6	 32.8	 33.3	 34.3
Percentage	of	SEB	income
	coming	from	the	business	 58.3	 65.2	 70.9	 75.7	 78.3	 83.5
	 	 	 	 	 	
Wealthy	SEBs	vs.	
	other	wealthy	households	 	 	 	 	 	
		Median	ratio	of	wealth	to	income	 	 	 	 	 	
				SEBs	 10.49	 8.82	 10.44	 9.86	 11.81	 13.88




			net	equity)	to	income	 	 	 	 	
				SEBs	 4.98	 4.46	 5.55	 5.42	 6.51	 7.84
				Others	 8.38	 8.76	 8.39	 10.28	 11.07	 11.11
	
		Median	ratio	of	debt	to	income	 	 	 	 	 	
				SEBs	 0.29	 0.64	 0.50	 0.90	 0.61	 0.91
				Others	 0.17	 0.15	 0.29	 0.31	 0.20	 0.43
aIndex:	1	corresponds	to	willing	to	take	substantial	risk;	2	to	take	above	average	risk;	3	to	take	average	risk;	and	4	to	take	no	risk.
Notes:	SEB	means	self-employed	business	owner.	Wealthy	SEBs	and	other	wealthy	households	are	those	in	the	top	decile	of	the	wealth	distribution.	
Source:	Authors’	calculations	based	on	data	from	the	Board	of	Governors	of	the	Federal	Reserve	System,	Survey of Consumer Finances.
starkly when looking at all the wealthy households 
(those in the top 10 percent of the wealth distribu-
tion). As seen in the bottom portion of table 9, the 
overall wealth-to-income ratio of wealthy SEBs is 
about the same as that of other rich households. How-
ever, the ratio of wealth (excluding business net equi-
ty) to income for SEBs is 30 percent to 50 percent 
below that of non-SEB households.18
An interesting, complementary finding by Heaton 
and Lucas (2000) suggests that entrepreneurs try to 
limit their risk exposure by holding less wealth in stock, 
compared with other similarly wealthy households.
Furthermore, SEBs raise both sides of their balance 
sheets to a much greater degree than other households. 
Notably, SEBs carry substantially more debt than other 
households: Their debt-to-income ratios are between 
one and a half and three times higher than those of 
wealthy non-SEBs.19 This means that relative to other 
households, a much greater percentage of SEBs’ in-
come stream is precommitted to servicing debt.
The combination of similar total wealth-to-income 
ratios, high concentrations of wealth in business equity, 
and high debt-to-income ratios suggest a greater tol-
erance for risk by entrepreneurs than by others, and 
hence, a lower predilection for precautionary saving.
Conclusion
Our findings support the view that entrepreneurs 
are important sources of saving and wealth creation 
in the U.S. economy. They start new businesses, in-
troduce new ideas or business concepts, invest large 
amounts of their net worth in their businesses, and 
take very large risks for potentially very large returns. 
Our findings also support the view that “market fric-
tions” prevent the entrepreneurs from completely di-
versifying away risks and, perhaps, from investing in 
their firms at an economically efficient level. We also 
find, however, indicators pointing to some easing of 
the borrowing constraints faced by entrepreneurs after 
the early 1990s. Our results on portfolio and income 
diversification and from direct questions regarding 
risk attitudes also indicate that entrepreneurs are less 
risk averse than the U.S. population at large. 34 4Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
NOTES
1Although we require that SEBs own at least one business, we do 
not restrict our analysis to households whose business net worth is 
above a given threshold. Therefore, we have not necessarily excluded 
owners of tiny businesses that may enter or exit operation quickly.
2We chose to not use the 1983 and 1986 SCF waves because these 
surveys appear to be of lower quality, and they did not ask all of the 
questions regarding the households’ business interests found in the 
six SCF waves that we use.
3The SCF generally takes place in the second half of the calendar 
year. Flow variables, notably income, refer to the previous calendar 
year; stock variables and demographic or business ownership iden-
tifiers cover current values. 
4The summary statistics we present in this article are calculated by 
first multiplying the relevant observations by their SCF weight. 
These are demographic weights that indicate how representative 
the observed household is of the U.S. population as a whole.
5The SEBs are overrepresented in the other portions of the  
upper ends of the wealth distribution as well. Nearly 40 percent  
of SEBs fall in the top wealth decile, and nearly one-quarter are  
in the top 5 percent of the wealth distribution. The SEBs make up 
25–30 percent of the top 10 percent of the wealth distribution and 
30–40 percent of the top 5 percent.
6There is some evidence of a countercyclical pattern for self-employed 
workers as a whole in the Current Population Survey (CPS), which 
is conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau for the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. (See Aaronson, Rissman, and Sullivan, 2004, and 
Rissman, 2006.) The CPS does not allow one to identify who among 
the self-employed own and manage a business operation. With regard 
to our results, many of those making cyclical transitions between 
self-employment and work for pay may not consider themselves as 
actively managing a business, and so they would not be included in 
our SEB sample. The movements in and out of self-employment of 
such individuals may indeed be countercyclical.  
7The education index is constructed by coding household heads as 
a 1 if they do not have a high school degree; a 2 if they have a high 
school degree only; a 3 if they have some college; and a 4 if they 
have a college degree. The index is the population-weighted aver-
age across respondents. 
8Note that C corporations may or may not be publicly traded, but 
the SCF questions regarding active business ownership instruct  
respondents to give only information on corporations that are not 
publicly traded that they own or share ownership of and in which 
they have an active management role. 
9Clearly, measurement error may be an important issue with busi-
ness net worth. The value of the firm is a self-reported number. So 
unless the SEB has recently received a credible buyout offer or 
other external assessment of the firm’s valuation, the answer to this 
question will be subjective. Valuation might be particularly diffi-
cult for SEBs running start-ups, since there is little track record 
available to judge the long-run potential of the firm.
10A small percentage of firms—0.05 percent—have a net worth less 
than –$2,200.
11We differ from Moore (2004) in that we do not include an adjust-
ment for the difference between the unrealized capital gain and the 
opportunity cost of capital.
12This result may seem surprising for firms with short ownership 
tenure, since they have had little time to reap the gains from capital 
investments made using retained earnings. However, other factors 
may be boosting their net equity. First, the SEB may have paid 
down a substantial amount of debt incurred when acquiring the 
business. Second, the survival of the SEB’s firm may provide a posi-
tive signal of the ongoing viability of the business venture, causing 
the SEB to give a more optimistic assessment of the value of the 
firm. Note, though, that we likely are underestimating annualized 
capital gains to the firms with short ownership tenure. This is because 
we do not know the exact month the firm was acquired; hence, we 
divided the change in value by one, even if the firm was created 
less than a year ago. 
13In addition, to avoid skewing the rates of return because of the 
earnings of businesses with little or negative net equity, we perform 
rate of return computations only for businesses with a net worth 
greater than $1,000. Even with this adjustment, however, some 
firms’ high rates of return may reflect relatively modest income 
flows against a base of very little net equity. Unfortunately, the 
SCF only records net equity in the business and does not separate 
assets and liabilities. Accordingly, we cannot calculate an alterna-
tive rate of return on assets. 
14Some of the higher dispersion among businesses with ownership 
tenure of one year or less might be affected by sampling error, since 
the number of SEBs in this category is a good deal smaller than 
those in the other two tenure classifications. 
15Some researchers, for example, Hurst and Lusardi (2004) ques-
tion the importance of credit constraints to entrepreneurial activity 
documented by much other literature on the subject.
16That said, conditioned on making a loan or pledging collateral, 
the size of such lending has trended up over time. The median 
commitment rose from between 12 percent and 20 percent of the 
net worth of the business in the first three surveys in our sample  
to about 25 percent in the 2001 and 2004 surveys. 
17The trends in legal structure do not appear to account for the 
trend in the business income share of total SEB income. All legal 
forms of business show an uptrend in the share of income derived 
from their business activity, and the differences in business shares 
among the legal forms are small.
18For comparison, among non-SEB households in the top decile  
of the wealth distribution, the median amount of wealth held in  
private business equity is zero, and the average amount varies be-
tween 9 percent and 12 percent. Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen 
(2002) also document the lack of portfolio diversifications for 
entrepreneurs.
19Undoubtedly, this is a natural consequence of borrowing to oper-
ate their businesses, although we cannot tell for sure because the 
SCF provides information on only the net value of the businesses, 
without separating their assets and liabilities. 35 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TaBlE a1
Number of observations in each SCF wave
	 1989	 1992	 1995	 1998	 2001	 2004
 SEBs  566  837  838  856  878  931
 Others  2,577  3,068  3,461  3,449  3,564  3,588
Notes:	SEB	means	self-employed	business	owner.	SCF	means	Survey of Consumer Finances.
Source:	Board	of	Governors	of	the	Federal	Reserve	System,	Survey of Consumer Finances.
APPENDIx
The number of observations in each wave of the Survey  
of Consumer Finances we use in our article appears in  
table A1.
Business net worth 
Business net worth equals the net equity if the busi-
ness were sold today, plus loans from the household to 
the business, minus the loans from the business to the 
household not reported as personal debt by the respon-
dent, plus the value of personal assets used as collateral 
for business loans not reported as an asset by the house-
hold earlier. Net equity is the self-reported answer to the 
question: “What is the net worth of the business? What 
could you sell it for today?” 
Self-employed business owners’ business income
Isolating the income SEB households earn from their 
businesses is not straightforward. We do so by combin-
ing the SCF questions that directly ask respondents how 
much salary or wages they earn from their main jobs and, 
in addition to regular salary, how much of the net earnings 
or other income they received from their businesses. We 
include income received by the spouses from the businesses. 
These data are not without problems, and measurement 
error is still a concern. For example, they may suffer 
from recollection error, and while salary data are for the 
current year, other business income refers to the calen-
dar year prior to the SCF. See Moore (2004) for a dis-
cussion of these and other issues. Still, we feel this ap-
proach is superior to using tax data, which the SCF also 
records. Importantly, partnership and S corporation income 
are found in form 1040, line 17, but line 17 also includes 
income from rental real estate, royalties, and trusts that 
might not be actively managed businesses by SEB house-
holds. Furthermore, S corporations and other closely 
held corporations can pay salaries to their owners. Such 
salary income is included in the regular wage and salary 
reporting in form 1040, line 7, but they also include wage 
earnings of family members from outside of the businesses. 
Computing business income net of taxes would be 
very interesting but requires work that goes beyond the 
scope of this article. It would be relatively easy to do so 
for businesses organized as C corporations because they 
face a flat tax rate on business income. Such firms, how-
ever, make up only a small fraction of the SEBs in our 
sample. For other types of SEBs, business income is in-
cluded in the households’ total income, and hence, it is 
tax-based on all of the household financial and demographic 
characteristics. Computing business income net of taxes 
does require a complicated and detailed algorithm.36 4Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
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